“亲亲相隐”问题中的道德认知易受个体自我中心的影响,因此其视角差异值得关注。通过三个研究比较了人们在当局者-旁观者视角下对“亲亲相隐”的道德认知,并考察了重要个体（自我建构和社会赞许性）和情境（错误严重性、社会关系和道德领域）因素的作用。结果发现：（1）个体对“亲亲相隐”的道德判断具有稳定的跨视角一致性;（2）相对旁观者视角,在当局者视角下个体的道德决策体现了更低的“亲亲相隐”倾向;（3）相对旁观者视角,在当局者视角下个体对“亲亲相隐”的道德认知分离程度更低,且更高的错误严重性促进了这一差异;（4）这些视角差异未受个体自我建构和社会赞许性的显著影响,并在多种道德领域中保持稳健,且仅存在于亲近者违法犯错的情况下。研究进一步揭示了中国人对“亲亲相隐”的复杂态度,有助于更深入地理解道德认知中的关系偏好。
Abstract
Western psychologists are examining how social relations shape personal moral cognition. Within this field, one significant question relates to one’s moral cognition and reaction tendencies toward close others’ moral transgressions. This question can be framed from the perspective of the Chinese cultural tradition surrounding “concealment between relatives,” which caused widespread controversy within the Chinese ethics circle at the beginning of this century. Confucius believed that it is morally right to protect and hide a family member if that person breaks the law. Many studies on this question have shown that people are not only more inclined to make moral decisions to protect close others when witnessing them committing a crime, but also more likely to recognize the moral legitimacy of protection. In fact, studies have shown this as a basic moral cognitive tendency with cross-cultural consistency among American, Japanese, and Chinese people.
Unlike trolley dilemmas, concealment between relatives, buttressed by a rich social relationship, is embodied as a self-centered moral problem in which it is difficult to avoid the influence of egocentrism. In particular, when existing research generally adopts a first-person perspective based on authorities, the corresponding self-centered deviation becomes more prominent. However, in some cases, the perspective of the authorities is conducive to a deeper understanding of the complexity of human moral cognition. A typical example is the “Veil of Ignorance,” with which Rawls further introduced the basic principle of protecting the rights of the disadvantaged with the help of the first person on the basis of the principle of absolute fairness formed in the third person. Similarly, a more direct but neglected question is: Do people have different moral cognitions toward the issue of kin concealment from the two perspectives of authorities and bystanders when facing the moral transgressions of their close others?
This study focused on these perspective differences to further reveal the complex attitudes toward kin concealment and to test the potential egocentric bias in existing studies. To begin, Study 1 directly tested these differences from the perspective of moral cognition. Further, Studies 2 and 3 verified the sensitivity of perspective differences to social relations and consistency across multiple moral fields. In the three studies, the first-person authority and third-person bystander perspectives were manipulated as a pair of intergroup variables. As for moral cognition, in addition to the “should” moral judgment and “would” moral decision-making, this study further included the separation of moral cognition (the difference between “should” and “would”) as an important moral cognition indicator to examine the extent to which the participants will protect their close friends out of selfishness rather than moral considerations.
The results showed that one’s judgment on the moral legitimacy of “concealment between relatives” maintains a stable cross-perspective consistency. Meanwhile, participants from the first-person authority perspective reported a relatively lower degree of moral decision-making intention and moral cognition separation in favor of close people (Studies 1~3). The corresponding differences in perspectives were sensitive to severity (Study 1) and social relationships (Study 2). In addition, the differences were not significantly affected by self-construction (Study 3) or social desirability (Study 2) at the individual level, and existed in many moral fields (Study 3). These results further reveal people’s contradictory attitudes toward kin concealment. That is, although this relationship preference is rooted in human moral cognition, the lower protective intention from the perspective of the authorities proves that punishing one’s own relatives for the cause of justice is a superior motive from the perspective of modern Chinese people. In addition, these differences highlight the importance of examining related moral cognition issues from multiple perspectives, using multiple indicators.
关键词
亲亲相隐 /
道德认知 /
道德判断 /
道德决策 /
认知视角
Key words
mutual concealment between relatives /
moral cognition /
moral judgement /
moral decision-making /
cognitive perspective
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.content}}
参考文献
[1] 邓晓芒. (2010a). 儒家伦理新批判. 重庆大学出版社..
[2] 邓晓芒. (2010b). 对儒家“亲亲互隐”的判决性实验. 南风窗, 23, 96.
[3] 范忠信. (1997). 中西法律传统中的“亲亲相隐”. 中国社会科学, 3, 87-104.
[4] 傅鑫媛, 陆智远, 寇彧. (2015). 陌生他人在场及其行为对个体道德伪善的影响. 心理学报, 47(8), 1058-1066.
[5] 葛枭语. (2021). 孝的多维心理结构: 取向之异与古今之变. 心理学报, 53(3), 306-321.
[6] 李杭州, 何宁, 李红, 韩雅伟. (2021). 宽以待己, 严于律人: 道德伪善的双加工机制. 心理科学, 44(6), 1396-1402.
[7] 李天然, 李晶, 俞国良. (2015). 自我抽离: 一种适应性的自我反省视角. 心理科学进展, 23(6), 1052-1060.
[8] 王剑. (2017). “亲亲相隐”制度在法治中国构建中的回归与适用. 重庆社会科学, 8 , 55-63.
[9] 卫旭华, 邹意. (2020). 亲亲相隐何时休? 关系对揭发意向影响的边界. 心理科学, 43(2), 423-429.
[10] Bandura, A. (2016). Moral disengagement: How people do harm and live with themselves. Worth Publishers.
[11] Berg, M. K. (2021). The devils we know and love: How close relationships influence moral decisions (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). The University of Michigan.
[12] Berg M. K., Kitayama S., & Kross E. (2021). How relationships bias moral reasoning: Neural and self-report evidence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 95, Article 104156.
[13] Bocian K., Baryla W., & Wojciszke B. (2020). Egocentrism shapes moral judgements. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 14(12), 1-14.
[14] Cross S. E., Bacon P. L., & Morris M. L. (2000). The relational-interdependent self-construal and relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(4), 791-808.
[15] Cross S. E., Hardin E. E., & Gercek-Swing B. (2011). The what, how, why, and where of self-construal. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15(2), 142-179.
[16] Forbes, R. C., & Stellar, J. E. (2022). When the ones we love misbehave: Exploring moral processes within intimate bonds. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 122(1), 16-33.
[17] Grossmann, I. (2017). Wisdom in context. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(2), 233-257.
[18] Guo, Q. Y., & Zhang, Z. Q. (2015). Mutual concealment between relatives revisited: A response to Liao Mingchun and Liang Tao. Contemporary Chinese Thought, 46(3), 67-95.
[19] Hofmann W., Brandt M. J., Wisneski D. C., Rockenbach B., & Skitka L. J. (2018). Moral punishment in everyday life. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 44(12), 1697-1711.
[20] Lee, J., & Holyoak, K. J. (2020). “But he’s my brother”: The impact of family obligation on moral judgments and decisions. Memory and Cognition, 48(1), 158-170.
[21] Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98(2), 224-253.
[22] McManus R. M., Kleiman-Weiner M., & Young L. (2020). What we owe to family: The impact of special obligations on moral judgment. Psychological Science, 31(3), 227-242.
[23] McManus R. M., Mason J. E., & Young L. (2021). Re-examining the role of family relationships in structuring perceived helping obligations, and their impact on moral evaluation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 96, Article 104182.
[24] Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: Dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review, 106(1), 3-19.
[25] Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Harvard University Press..
[26] Schein, C. (2020). The importance of context in moral judgments. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 15(2), 207-215.
[27] Singelis, T. M. (1994). The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(5), 580-591.
[28] Soter L. K., Berg M. K., Gelman S. A., & Kross E. (2021). What we would (but shouldn’t) do for those we love: Universalism versus partiality in responding to others’ moral transgressions. Cognition, 217, Article 104886.
[29] Thomson, J. J. (1985). The trolley problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94(6), 1395-1415.
[30] Weidman A. C., Sowden W. J., Berg M. K., & Kross E. (2020). Punish or protect? How close relationships shape responses to moral violations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 46(5), 693-708.
[31] Yu H. B., Siegel J. Z., & Crockett M. J. (2019). Modeling morality in 3-D: Decision-making, judgment, and inference. Topics in Cognitive Science, 11(2), 409-432.
[32] Zhu Y., Zhang L., Fan J., & Han S. H. (2007). Neural basis of cultural influence on self-representation. NeuroImage, 34(3), 1310-1316.
基金
*本研究得到国家自然科学基金面上项目(31971014)和江苏省研究生科研创新项目(KYCX22_1444)的资助
PDF(626 KB)
