信任决策是个体在不确定性下作出是否信任他人的风险性社会决策,是人类社会生活的重要组成部分。研究采用噪音信任博弈范式,旨在从互动环境与主体的双视角出发,验证意图信息透明度以及意图类型与决策结果在信任决策中的重要作用。实验1以无噪音条件作为基线,探索意图信息透明度（清晰vs. 模糊）对信任决策的影响。结果发现：被试在意图信息模糊条件下的信任水平显著低于无噪音和意图信息清晰条件;实验2探索在意图信息清晰时,意图类型（互惠vs. 违背）与决策结果（收益vs. 损失）对信任决策的影响。结果发现：不论结果是收益或损失,互惠意图组被试的信任水平都显著高于违背意图组。研究揭示了在人际互动中意图信息透明和互惠意图均是个体作出信任他人决策的重要依据。
Abstract
Trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive exceptions of other’s behavior or intention. At present, most studies assume that both players are in an environment with sufficient information, and behavioral outcomes can perfectly reflect behavioral intentions. However, most daily interpersonal interactions contain elements of uncertainty or ambiguity, and results are not always consistent with intentions. Two theoretical models of interpersonal trust put forward different views. The result-based model emphasizes that people make decisions based on feedback results in a trust game. The intention-based model argues that what matters in interactions is the perception of other people's intentions. Therefore, some studies focus on the influence of the trust intention of the trustor on the reciprocity behavior of the trustee from the perspective of the trustee, and fail to fully characterize how the intention of the trustee affects the trust decision of the trustor in the trust relationship.
This research conducted two studies to explore the effects of intention information transparency and intention types on trust decisions using an adapted Trust Game - Noisy Trust Game (NTG). There is a certain probability that the choice of the trustee will be distorted into the opposite choice. Study 1 was a single-factor within-subject design. The dependent variable was the investment ratios. According to whether the trustee's intent is revealed, intention information was divided into two types: clear intention information and obscure intention information. While the no-noise condition was used as the control condition. Study 2 was a 2 (Intention types: reciprocity vs. violation) × 2 (Decision outcome: gain vs. loss) within-subjects design in the context of clear intention information. The dependent variable was the investment amounts. Because of the noise, The trustee's choice to return(reciprocity) may be distorted to retain keep(lose), and their choice to keep(violation) may be distorted to retain return (gain). The participants invested in any number from 0 to 10. RStudio and SPSS 25.0 were used for data analysis.
The results show that the main effect of information transparency is significant in study 1 (p < .001). After comparison, we find the clear intention group trust level is lower than the obscure intention group (p < .001) and the no-noise condition (p < .001). There is no significant difference in the trust level between the clear intention group and the no-noise condition. This suggests that obscure intention information inhibits trust decisions compared with clear intention information and the no-noise situation. The results of study 2 show that the main effects of intention types (p < .001) and outcome (p < .001), as well as their interaction (p < .01) are significant (p < .001). Simple effect analysis showed that in both gain and loss outcomes, the trust level of the participants in the reciprocal intention group is significantly higher than that in the violation intention group(p < .001). In the case of reciprocal intention, the trust level of the gain group is significantly higher than that of the loss group (p < .01), and there is no significant difference between the trust level of the gain group and the loss group (p > .05).
Through the noisy trust game task, this study reveals the influence of behavioral intention on trust decisions. Clear intention information and reciprocal intention are important basis for individuals to make trust decisions in interpersonal communication. This study supports the integration model of trust and verifies the significant influence of benevolence on trust decision-making. This study improves the application of interpersonal trust model in different situations. When others express reciprocal intention, individuals adjust their trust decisions based on their profit and loss. However, when the subjective intention of others is to violate trust, individuals' trust level is the same regardless of the result or loss. An important practical revelation is that, in social activities involving trust decisions (e.g., interpersonal communication or business transactions), some strategies to increase intention information transparency and reciprocal intention are positive to establish a good trust relationship.
关键词
意图信息透明度 /
互惠意图 /
信任决策 /
噪音信任博弈 /
人际信任模型
Key words
intention information transparency /
reciprocal intention /
trust decisions /
noisy trust game /
interpersonal trust model
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基金
*本研究得到国家社会科学基金项目（20CSH069）的资助
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