Intuitive Logic: Conflict Detection and the Mechanism of Individual Differences

doi:10.16719/j.cnki.1671-6981.20240107

Abstract

Abstract: The logical intuitions model assumes the existence of two different types of intuitive processing. While heuristic intuitions automatically apply knowledge and beliefs, logical intuitions are based on simple logical knowledge and probabilistic rules that can help individuals automatically arrive at answers conforming to logical rules without engaging in analytical processing. Consequently, logical intuitions can help people develop mechanisms for solving reasoning problems quickly and accurately.
The two-response paradigm, instructional paradigm, and logic-liking or logic-brightness paradigm are widely used experimental paradigms. Specifically, the two-response paradigm requires participants to make two successive responses to the same question. In the initial response, participants are asked to respond to the question as quickly as possible based on their intuition. They can then reflect on the question in depth and consider it thoroughly before giving a second response. The instructional paradigm requires participants to respond to a given instruction by setting both a logic-based response and a belief-based response. The Logic-liking or logic-brightness paradigm requires participants to give their liking-rating or brightness-rating for the current conclusion, rather than directly judging the logical validity of the conclusion. Researchers have verified the existence of logical intuition from different perspectives through these paradigms.
The elicitation of conflict detection suggests discrepancies between logical and heuristic intuitions. The emergence of conflict implies an incongruence between the corresponding processing of beliefs and the corresponding processing of logic, indicating that the individual has developed a sensitivity to logic. Most individuals detect a cognitive conflict between the two intuitions whether they produce a logic-based or belief-based response. One possibility for inducing conflict detection is that the two intuitions have different strengths. However, as the strength of logical intuitions decreased, the level of conflict detection appeared to increase significantly for logical reasoners and decrease for heuristic reasoners. This implies that individual differences may exist in logical intuitions.
Cognitive ability is the key variable for measuring individual differences in the study of logical intuition. Individuals with high cognitive ability may be in a better position to detect and resolve cognitive conflicts and thus arrive at logical answers. In contrast, individuals with low cognitive ability may not have the relevant logical knowledge and mindware, or if they do have this knowledge, failure to apply it to the appropriate problem (i.e., it may not be sufficiently practiced forming a high degree of automation) may lead to failure in conflict detection or to a low enough degree to warrant attention.
In general, the article reviews recent research on logical intuitions in terms of conflict detection and individual differences, summarizes the common problems in the literature, and suggests corresponding solutions to address them. First, it is not possible to determine the level of involvement in analytical processing. Second, the relationship between individual differences and reasoning strategies is further clarified through the instructional paradigm. Finally, with respect to the lack of abundant theoretical constructs, research should further clarify the operational definition and indicators of logical intuitions. In addition, more hypotheses based on the logical intuition model should be available for examination in empirical studies and emphasis should be placed on the development and application of logical intuition for individuals with low cognitive ability.

Key words: logical intuitions, heuristic intuitions, conflict detection, individual differences, cognitive ability

摘要： 逻辑直觉模型认为个体有逻辑和启发式两类直觉。冲突检测是检验逻辑直觉存在的重要方法。当个体做出逻辑反应时,说明逻辑直觉在发挥作用并能检测到自身和启发式直觉的冲突。近年来,研究者将认知能力作为个体差异的主要测量变量,发现认知能力能够正向预测逻辑直觉的运用。然而,基于逻辑直觉的研究存在理论建构不够丰富等问题。未来应当从明确逻辑直觉操作性定义和改进实验范式出发,进一步提出可供实证研究检验的假设,为逻辑直觉的运用和发展提供更为坚实的理论支持。

关键词: 逻辑直觉, 启发式直觉, 冲突检测, 个体差异, 认知能力

Wang Yunhong, Luo Junlong. Intuitive Logic: Conflict Detection and the Mechanism of Individual Differences[J]. Journal of Psychological Science, 2024, 47(1): 52-60.

王允宏, 罗俊龙. 直觉的逻辑性：冲突检测和个体差异的作用机制^*[J]. 心理科学, 2024, 47(1): 52-60.

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