Bribery, a fundamental form of corruption, involves public officials using their positions to illegally acquire property and gain personal advantage, making it one of the most damaging corrupt practices in society. Previous studies indicate that interpersonal connections influence decisions regarding bribery. Individuals tend to favor closer associates when contemplating whether to accept a bribe, thereby elevating the likelihood of succumbing to corruption. Furthermore, the perception of interpersonal closeness varies between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In collectivist societies, distinctions in how individuals treat those of varying closeness levels are more pronounced, whereas such differences are less pronounced in individualistic cultures.
Hence, the central question arises: do cultural disparities impact the interpersonal mechanisms that govern bribery decisions? We hypothesize that interpersonal relationships exert a more substantial influence on bribery decisions in collectivist cultures, which prioritize interpersonal relationships, than in individualist cultures. Interpersonal relationships are categorized into direct and indirect relationships, and this study also examines how bribery decisions based on direct and indirect relationships behave differently. To account for potential moderating factors, we also investigate how cultural differences in the effects of relationships may vary in the context of risk probability and bribe amounts.
The experiments were conducted in China and the U.S. Data for Chinese subjects were collected on the Credamo platform and data for U.S. subjects were collected on Amazon Mechanical Turk. In the experimental procedure, each subject first reads the instruction, then reads the situational story and makes a bribe decision in each independent variable condition. We manipulated the independent variable conditions through different situational stories. A four-factor mixed design was used:2 (country: United States, China) × 3 (relationship distance: relative, friend, stranger) × 2 (risk probability: 20%, 80%) × 2 (bribe amount: 50,000, 500,000). Country is a between-group variable and other factors are within-group variables. The dependent variable is the probability of bribery. Two experiments were conducted before and after this study with similar procedures to explore the direct and indirect relationships respectively by changing the situational stories.
In Experiment 1, we examined the direct relation and found that the probability of bribery decreased as the relationship distance increased in both China and the United States. However, it is essential to note that disparities exist between the two countries. Notably, the strength of the relationship effect is significantly more pronounced in China compared to the United States. Furthermore, Experiment 1 also revealed the presence of a three-way interaction effect of relationship distance, country, and risk probability, implying that cultural distinctions in relationship effects manifest only in low-risk circumstances.
In Experiment 2, the examination shifted to the indirect relation, where the results underscored a significant interaction between relationship distance and country. Specifically, in the United States, no discernible relationship effect was observed in the context of bribery decision. Conversely, in the collectivist culture of China, a clear inverse relation was observed, with the likelihood of bribery gradually decreasing as the indirect relationship distance increased. It is noteworthy that this interaction effect was only discernible in low-risk scenarios, with no substantial disparities in high-risk conditions.
Based on the results, we conclude that, on the one hand, there is cross-cultural consistency in the influence of interpersonal relationships on bribery decisions. In both collectivist and individualistic countries, bribery probability decreases with the increase of relationship distance. On the other hand, there is cross-cultural variability in the effect of relationships on the decision to accept a bribe, with stronger relationship effects in collectivist than in individualist countries, both in direct and indirect relations, and with cultural differences in relationship effects differing only in the low-risk condition.
Key words
direct interpersonal relationship /
indirect interpersonal relationship /
collectivism /
individualism /
bribery decision
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