The Influence of Relative Bargaining Power on Unethical Negotiation Strategy in Political-Enterprise Negotiations

doi:10.16719/j.cnki.1671-6981.20250114

Abstract

Abstract: Negotiation, as one of the common means of reaching an agreement in government-enterprise cooperation, is a process in which two or more parties seek appropriate ways to resolve conflicts and achieve goals. However, due to different levels of mastery of information, the demand for resources, and the existence of other conditions, the power of the negotiating parties is not always equal. In China, the same applies to the bargaining power of the government and enterprises. Previous studies have shown that the bargaining power affects the choice of negotiating strategies. Accordingly, this study proposes that negotiating subjects with strong bargaining power will engage in more unethical negotiation tactics, such as traditional competitive bargaining, attacking an opponent's network, false promises, misrepresentation, and inappropriate information gathering. This study investigates the effect of bargaining power on the use of unethical negotiation tactics by both political and enterprise negotiators in government-enterprise negotiations. It explores the role of stimulating risk-seeking preferences by negotiators in the relationship between bargaining power and unethical negotiation tactics.
There were 572 participants in behavioral experiments (between-subject design) of this study. Firstly, the bargaining power (high vs. low) was manipulated using the situational framing material. Then, the Self-reported Inappropriate Negotiation Strategies Scale (SINS) and the Stimulating Risk-Taking Scale (SRT) were used to measure participants’ choice of unethical negotiation tactics, and their stimulating risk-taking preferences. This study tested the hypotheses using IBM SPSS Statistics 23 software and ANOVA analysis. Prior to analysis, this study virtually assigned the variables (negotiation role: government = 1, enterprise = 2; bargaining power: the government has more negotiating power = 1, the enterprise has more negotiating power = 2). Specifically, the two-way ANOVA analysis and simple effect analysis were first performed to investigate whether the use of unethical negotiation tactics, including traditional competitive bargaining, attacking an opponent's network, false promises, misrepresentation, and inappropriate information gathering, is differentiated by negotiation role, bargaining power, and the interaction of both. Three-way ANOVA analysis and simple effect analysis were then used to test the moderated effect of stimulus risk-taking. Group setting dummy variables (stimulus risk-taking was first ranked and then coded according to 27% of the ranking results) were performed for stimulus risk-taking (low(the first 27%) = -1, high(the last 27%) = 1). The results showed that: (1) Enterprise negotiators with strong bargaining power are more likely to adopt the traditional competitive bargaining strategy and to attack an opponent's network strategy. (2) Government negotiators with strong bargaining power are more likely to adopt a traditional competitive bargaining strategy but less likely to use an inappropriate information gathering strategy. (3) Bargaining power and the role of the negotiator have no interaction effect on false promises, or misrepresentation. (4) The stimulated risk-taking preference of the negotiator regulates the relation between government-enterprise relative bargaining power and attacking an opponent's network. Under the highly stimulated risk-seeking preference, the interaction of negotiation role and bargaining power has an increased positive effect on attacking an opponent's network.
The government-enterprise relationship is a key aspect of promoting China's rapid economic development. The cooperation between the government and enterprises will be further strengthened. As a means in the construction of government-enterprise cooperation, the negotiation will appear frequently, and its results will have a certain impact on social and economic development. The current study explored the mechanisms between bargaining power, negotiation role, and unethical negotiation tactics. It revealed the important role of individual character in stimulus risk-taking preferences in the above relation. This study enriched the literature on micro-research in the fields of government and enterprise negotiation. The findings can provide theoretical guidelines for more effective and fair government-business negotiations. It is of great significance to promote the success of the negotiations and form government-enterprise cooperation.

Key words: government-enterprise negotiations, risk seeking, unethical negotiation tactics

摘要： 为探究谈判中相对谈判实力对双方采用不道德谈判策略的影响,同时关注谈判个体的刺激性风险寻求在上述机制中发挥的调节效应,对572名被试进行行为实验。结果发现,谈判角色与相对谈判实力共同对不道德谈判策略中的竞争性讨价还价策略、攻击对手的人际网络策略与不正当信息收集策略产生影响。企业在相对谈判实力强时会更多采取竞争性讨价还价策略和攻击对手人际网络策略;政府在相对谈判实力强时会更多采取竞争性讨价还价策略,在相对谈判实力弱时反而会更多采取不正当信息收集策略。谈判角色与相对谈判实力并未对虚假承诺以及误传信息策略产生影响。刺激性风险寻求增强了双方相对谈判实力对攻击对手人际网络策略的影响,但并未强化相对谈判实力与其他类型不道德谈判策略的关系。研究发现有助于了解谈判中相对谈判实力对双方不道德谈判策略选择的影响及边界条件,为双方更有效、公平的谈判实践提供理论指导。

关键词: 政企谈判, 刺激性风险寻求, 不道德谈判策略

Shang Zhe, Zuo Chenhui, Wang Chongfeng, Ma Li. The Influence of Relative Bargaining Power on Unethical Negotiation Strategy in Political-Enterprise Negotiations[J]. Journal of Psychological Science, 2025, 48(1): 140-152.

尚哲, 左臣惠, 王崇锋, 马力. 谈判中相对谈判实力对不道德谈判策略的影响^*[J]. 心理科学, 2025, 48(1): 140-152.

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