The Underlying Mechanism of Believing and Sharing of Misinformation: Based on the Tinbergen&#x02019;s Framework

Li Yuchu; Zhang Siqi; Ding Geyi; Niu Jiawen; Rao Lilin

doi:10.16719/j.cnki.1671-6981.20250217

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Journal of Psychological Science ›› 2025, Vol. 48 ›› Issue (2) : 447-458. DOI: 10.16719/j.cnki.1671-6981.20250217

Social, Personality & Organizational Psychology

The Underlying Mechanism of Believing and Sharing of Misinformation: Based on the Tinbergen’s Framework

Li Yuchu^1,2, Zhang Siqi^1,2, Ding Geyi^1,2, Niu Jiawen^1,2, Rao Lilin^1,2

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Abstract

Online misinformation has become a major aspect of the 21st century media ecosystem. The spread of misinformation poses an important challenge. Based on the Tinbergen’s theoretical framework, we systematically reviewed published works on the proximal and distal mechanisms of people’s believing and sharing of misinformation from both static and dynamic perspectives. To comprehensively understand a characteristic, Tinbergen (1963) pointed out that four fundamentally different types of problem (so called “Tinbergen Four Questions framework”) are raised, which he listed as “causation”, “ontogeny”, “survival value”, and “evolution” (Tinbergen, 1963). These four questions are based on a 2 * 2 matrix consisting of a dynamic versus a static view of a characteristic and a proximal versus a distal view of that feature. This structure yields four quadrants in which to place knowledge about people’s believing and sharing of misinformation.
In the causation quadrant, scholars ask static causal questions. Existing work has focused on the effects of cognitive style, motivation, and emotion on people’s believing and sharing of misinformation. Research on cognitive style showed that analytic thinking positively predicted the ability to discern between fake and real news (Pennycook & Rand, 2019b). Studies on motivation showed that (1) participants with a stronger accuracy motivation (Panizza et al., 2022) and a greater tendency to accept information consistent with their preexisting values and beliefs (Scheufele & Krause, 2019) were better at discerning truth from falsehood; (2) the most cited intrinsic motivations to share misinformation were accuracy motivation and entertainment; and (3) the most cited extrinsic motivations to share misinformation were self-promotion and political ideology (Melchior & Oliveira, 2024). Research on emotions has shown that across a wide range of specific emotions, heightened emotionality is associated with increased belief in fake news and decreased ability to discern between real and fake news (Martel et al., 2020), and that positive emotions promote gullibility (Brashier & Marsh, 2020; Forgas, 2019). But the effect of negative emotion is inconclusive. Some studies found that negative emotion reduced gullibility, while other studies found that anger promoted politically aligned motivated belief in misinformation (Weeks, 2015).
In the ontogeny quadrant, scholars ask dynamic developmental questions. Existing literature suggests that there might be a U-shaped relationship between age and people’s believing and sharing of misinformation. Compared with young adults, children, teenagers, and older adults were more likely to believe and share online misinformation (Danovitch & Lane, 2020), leading to a worse ability to discern between fake and real news.
In the survival value quadrant, scholars ask static functional questions. Existing work provides three possible explanations. First, believing in falsehoods may serve adaptive functions to detect potentially dangerous coalitions (van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018). Second, the truth-default theory (Levine, 2014) posits that humans are vulnerable to false information because trusting others by default is beneficial for effective communication. Third, believing in falsehoods may serve adaptive functions to help individuals seek coherence and meaning (Yong et al., 2021).
In the evolution quadrant, scholars ask dynamic historical questions. Research in animals has shown that misinformation occurred in the form of false alarms is surprisingly common across a range of taxa, including insects, amphibians, fish, mammals, and birds (Gray & Webster, 2023). But extant research has neglected to examine the emergence and maintenance of people’s believing and sharing of misinformation in historical evolutionary terms.
The intersection of these four complementary questions yields new avenues for theory and research into misinformation. While extensive research has been done to understand the proximal mechanisms of believing and sharing of misinformation, existing work on the distal mechanisms is much more limited. Future research should clarify the impact of emotions, explore the distal mechanisms by which people believe and share misinformation, and strengthen localized research.

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misinformation / Tinbergen / proximal and distal / static and dynamic

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Li Yuchu, Zhang Siqi, Ding Geyi, Niu Jiawen, Rao Lilin. The Underlying Mechanism of Believing and Sharing of Misinformation: Based on the Tinbergen’s Framework[J]. Journal of Psychological Science. 2025, 48(2): 447-458 https://doi.org/10.16719/j.cnki.1671-6981.20250217

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