Based on the Dual-process theory, the current studies of interactions between intuition and deliberation mostly focused on independent and combination function of each other, but only a few works were related to the sequential relationship, and even less discussion was under emergency. The purpose of this study is to explore the Substitution Effects of intuition and deliberation sequential decision-making under an escape condition. The Substitution Effects of intuition and deliberation is a phenomenon that the former intuitive decision-making results are substituted by the latter deliberative process. However, sometimes the substitution effects might reverse as the latter deliberation be influenced by the former intuition. In addition, former studies showed that different presentations of information influenced the individual’s judgment and decision-making. Thus, this study discusses the influence of different forms of information on the Substitution Effects. In this study, the information presented is classified as explicit and implicit clues by clarity. Overall, 180 subjects are recruited for the main study. Two preliminary experiments and two main ones are conducted. The two preliminary experiments are to construct the explicit and implicit escape information clues during a fire hazard. The explicit information clues consist of three main escape ways: running to the exit, avoiding the smoke, and following the people. The implicit information clues consist of 18 words corresponding to the explicit ones. The two main experiments are to explore the Substitution Effects of intuition and deliberation when people make escape decisions with explicit and implicit information clues presented. Each main experiment contains three groups of intuition, deliberation and deliberation-after-intuition. The main findings are: (1) With explicit escape information clues presented, significantly fewer subjects choose “following the people” on the conditions of intuition-after-deliberation and deliberation, compared with the intuition condition, but no significant differences on the other two choices. (2) With implicit escape information clues presented, there are some significant differences between intuition and deliberation, but no significant differences between intuition and deliberation-after-intuition. The conclusions are: (1) Deliberation partly substitutes the former intuition when explicit information clues are presented in a fire escape situation. (2) With some implicit information clues presented, deliberation does not substitute the former intuition but is covered by the former one in a fire escape situation, which can be called the Reverse Substitution Effect.