Abstract: Two fundamental theories in social cognition are long debated about how people understand the mental states of others. The mentalizing account posits mind-reading abilities as reflective, theory-based inferential processes that develop gradually from childhood learning, whereas the embodiment account contends them as reflexive, simulation-based enactive processes that are genetically inherited. Recent research found new evidence that even infants and non-human primates can automatically represent what others see, intend, and believe. For instance, infants and chimpanzees can expect an agent to reach toward a location where he or she believes a desirable object to be hidden, even when the agent’s belief is false. This ‘implicit mentalizing’ is interpreted as the root form of explicit, language-based mind reading skills in adults, and is believed to build a bridge linking two theories, since it confirms the inferential component of mentalizing account and also favors the nativist view of embodied account. However, a new theory named ‘submentalizing’ was recently proposed to provide an alternative interpretation for implicit mentalizing. By re-examining methodological flaws of all relevant studies in children and adults, submentalizing theorists assert that implicit mentalizing depends on general purpose neurocognitive mechanisms, rather than mechanisms that are specialized for inferential process or embodied process. Specifically, they point out that most empirical evidence for implicit mentalizing to date could be simply caused by domain-general cognitive mechanisms (e.g. Involuntary attentional orienting, spatial memory, retroactive interference and distraction), because they all can simulate the behavioral effects of mentalizing. Therefore, the submentalizing theory concludes that humans may not need dedicated mentalizing/embodiment as much as previously thought for social cognition—domain-general processes alone can provide a fast and efficient substrate to understand other’s mind in everyday life, allowing people to navigate a wide range of social situations without really thinking about or simulating mental states. We suggest this ‘submentalizing’ theory provides a novel and promising approach to explore the underlying mechanisms of implicit mentalizing. It goes beyond the classical debate of ‘mentalizing vs embodiment’ in social cognition, and instead posits submentalizing processes can ultimately substitute both theories. Its theoretical framework not only challenges the core position of mental states ascription in mentalizing account, but also refutes the nativist view of embodied account. It motivates researchers to re-evaluate all existing evidence of implicit mentalizing and provides a reductionism perspective to understand the nature of social cognition (i.e. the relationship between social and non-social processes). In addition to its theoretical contributions, the submentalizing theory also gives constructive implications for methodological issues and sheds light on future research directions. For example, future studies in mind reading should start to utilize well-controlled procedures (e.g. self-informed belief induction) to manipulate subjects’ perceptual and belief states, and also need to include closely matched inanimate control conditions and subtle attentional measures to completely rule out the interpretations of domain-general processes. In conclusion, we suggest the submentalizing theory has taken an ambitious but solid first step to question current theories in social cognition. To fully validate its claims and implications (e.g. substitute mentalizing/embodiment theories), future studies are needed to be implemented in multiple disciplines (i.e. neuropsychology and primate research) and with novel experimental strategies and advanced technologies (e.g. eye-tracking, fMRI, fNIRS).

Key words: social cognition, embodied cognition, mentalizing, submentalizing

摘要： 社会认知的机制一直存在心智化与具身认知观点的争论。前者认为社会认知是对心理状态的推测，而后者则认为社会认知是具身实践活动。虽然，心智化研究者认为具身认知有关灵长类动物和婴儿的社会认知的解释可以兼容于内隐心智化，但内隐心智化在解释社会互动时仍然存在间接性的问题。近期，潜心智化理论旨在挑战上述立场中有关社会认知先天论的预设，该理论将个体的潜心智化视为内隐心智化的替代，通过检验与分析相关研究的构想效度，强调社会认知是从非社会性的一般认知功能中衍生而来的，这种立场在社会认知的领域特殊性与非社会认知的领域一般性之间建立起了纽带，从而挑战了心智化与具身认知的争论。未来研究应设计更为严谨的心智化研究方法并对其进行方法学验证，借助先进的技术手段，尝试在神经科学层面探索一般认知功能与社会认知的关系。

关键词: 社会认知, 具身认知, 心智化, 潜心智化