Abstract: Abstract According to the approach inhibition theory of power, powerful lead to behavior approach tendency, powerless lead to behavior inhibition tendency under the condition of stable power relationship. However, when the power is no longer stable, it is unknown that the relationship between powerful and behavior approach tendency, and the relation between powerless and behavior inhibit tendency are still the same, or will be broken and even reversed. Therefore, the current study assumed that under unstable power condition, powerful exhibited more behavior inhibition tendency, powerless showed more behavior approach tendency. In addition, current study also hypothesized that power motivation enhanced this reverse effect, to be specific, the higher power motivation was, the more obvious behavior inhibition tendency of powerful was, and the more obvious behavior approach tendency of powerless was. Two experiments were designed to test these ideas. In Experiment 1, role play method was adopted to manipulate sense of power and instability of power. All participants were randomly assigned to play role of "distributor" (high power) or the role of "recipient" (low power) in gambling task. Under the condition of power instability, participants were told that their role will be adjusted according to their performance in gambling task, while participants under the condition of power stability were not informed with this. Then participants accomplished gambling task for measuring power effect in which they decided to choose different strategy of wining rewards, one was conservative decision strategy to make small gain and loss, the other was risk decision strategy to make big gain or loss. Experiment 2 adopted the real role assignment method to manipulate sense of power and instability of power. All participants were randomly appointed with “distributors”(high power) or “recipients” (low power) in money allocation tasks. After role assignment, participants were asked to complete two round of money allocation task of taking the benefit-oriented behaviors in money allocation to measure the effect of power. The role of “distributors” or “recipients” can not be changed during the first round (power stability condition), while during the second round of money allocation task (power instability condition), all participants were informed if the “distributor” did not perform well, his role will be degraded into “recipient”, meanwhile the previously related “recipient” will be turned to be “distributor” in the third round. The result of experiment showed that, under the condition of stable power, the powerful showed more risk behaviors and more benefit oriented behaviors over the powerless; while in the condition of unstable power, the powerless showed more risk behaviors and more benefit oriented behavior over the powerful. In addition, the individual power motivation not solely enhance the inhibition tendency of the powerful’s benefit oriented behaviors, but also promote the approach tendency of the powerless’s benefit oriented behaviors. This research confirmed that instability of power possesses reverse impact upon power effect and the power motivation functions as enhancement to the reverse effect.

Key words: Power Effect, Instability of Power, Power Motivation

摘要： 摘 要 基于权力的趋近-抑制理论，本研究探讨权力不稳定性对权力效应产生逆转作用以及权力动机对这一逆转作用的影响。实验采用角色扮演法和真实任务角色来操纵被试的权力水平和权力不稳定性，以赌博任务中的冒险行为和金钱分配任务中的趋利行为来测量被试的权力趋近/抑制效应。结果发现：权力稳定条件下，高权力被试比低权力被试表现出更多的冒险行为和趋利行为；权力不稳定条件下则相反，低权力被试比高权力被试表现出更多的冒险行为和趋利行为。权力不稳定条件下高权力动机的高权力者相比低权力动机的高权力者倾向给自己分配更少的金额数，表现出更为明显的抑制倾向；而高权力动机的低权力者相比低权力动机的低权力者倾向于提出更高要求的金额数，表现出更为明显的趋近倾向。该研究证实了权力不稳定性对权力效应的逆转作用，而权力动机对这一逆转作用起到增强趋势。

关键词: 权力效应, 权力不稳定性, 权力动机