What does it do to people when they are rich or poor? Do they differ in their patterns of prosociality towards others? For example, are the rich more or less likely to share their wealth with others? These questions are relevant to any society, but perhaps even more so in contemporary China which faces a transition to greater wealth as well as greater differences in wealth. Some research from western societies suggests that relative to lower class individuals, individuals from upper class backgrounds tend to show less generosity and behave more self-serving. They also focus more on their personal goals and show less compassion toward others. We should note, however, this line of evidence is somewhat inconsistently observed across methods or samples. Here we test the effect of social class on prosociality in China, a large country which faces a transition to greater wealth but also stronger wealth inequality. There are reasons to believe that such effect may be different in China. Note that individualistic cultures such as the United States emphasize the importance of autonomy and the pursuit of personal goals, whereas collectivistic cultures such as China emphasize the importance of interdependent self-construal and the pursuit of collective goals.
In this research, using both nationwide and university student samples in China, we conducted two studies to test how objective and subjective social class influence prosociality. In Study 1, we measured participants’ objective and subjective social class and assessed their prosociality by asking them to report the percent of annual income that they spent on charitable donations last year. In Study 2, we measured participants’ objective social class and manipulated subjective social class by asking participants to compare themselves to the people at the very bottom (or top) of the social ladder. To measure participants’ prosociality, we observed the offer they send to another participant in a dictator game. Notably, as the costs of prosociality rise, the likelihood and magnitude of prosociality diminish. Thus, the effect of social class on prosociality cannot rule out an alternative explanation that prosociality is simply less affordable for lower class participants. To address this issue, Study 2 also created a third-party dictator game in which participants would play on behalf of the other player, thus prosociality in the third-party dictator game is costless, making higher- and lower-class participants’ prosociality more comparable. In addition, Study 2 tested the potential mechanisms (e.g., feelings of social responsibility) that explained the effects of social class on prosociality.
The two studies reveal three key findings. First, in China, higher objective social class participants behaved in a more selfish fashion when they were perceived to have lower (but not higher) subjective social class. Second, such effect could be explained by feelings of social responsibility. Third, the cost of prosociality did not moderate this class effect on prosociality.
These findings underline the importance of studying samples beyond WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) to address issues on social class and prosociality, and suggest that the wealthy in China are less prosociality when they feel that they are less wealthy. Importantly, recent evidence indicates that Chinese people tend to be more lower-class identification. Taken together, a lower-class identification might damage the prosocial mindset among (wealthy) Chinese people.