Representational pluralism: A New Assumption on Conceptual Representation Mechanism

Hao-sheng YE

Journal of Psychological Science ›› 2014, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (2) : 483-489.

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PDF(5326 KB)
Journal of Psychological Science ›› 2014, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (2) : 483-489.

Representational pluralism: A New Assumption on Conceptual Representation Mechanism

  • 1,Hao-sheng YE
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Abstract

On the traditional view, conceptual representations are abstract symbols which don’t have any connections with perception systems. The embodied theories of conceptual representation hold that conceptual representation is grounded in the same neural systems that govern sensation, perception and action. Therefore the perceptual systems are central to concepts representations. However, perceptual representations are ill-suited for representing abstract concepts. This limitation implies that our conceptual system may employ multiple representation processing, one involve perceptual system which are suited for bearing perceptually derived contents and the another involve abstract symbols which are suited for bearing abstract contents. The evidence from pathology literature, cognitive neuroscience studies and behavior studies found different patterns of representation are associated with the processing of concrete and abstract concepts which support this representational pluralism. The interrelation between different representation mechanisms should be investigated in the future researches.

Key words

conceptual representation / embodied cognition / abstract symbols / representational pluralism

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Hao-sheng YE. Representational pluralism: A New Assumption on Conceptual Representation Mechanism[J]. Journal of Psychological Science. 2014, 37(2): 483-489
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