以往研究多使用经典道德困境对单被试的道德决策进行探讨。当前研究采用能够量化决策者结果敏感性、道德规范敏感性和一般不行动倾向的CNI(consequence, norm, inaction)模型,通过两个实验考察公开情境对道德两难决策的影响。实验1使用社会观察范式,发现他人观察并不影响被试的道德决策。实验2使用双人平行判断范式和共同判断范式。结果显示,这两种情境下被试对道德困境中主体的行为做出了更多的“不接受”反应,被试出现了明显的不行动倾向,同时共同判断组的道德规范敏感性增加。研究表明,公开情境下个体看似道义的决策可能源于营造良好社会形象的需要以及避免承担行动责任的动机。
Abstract
Moral judgment is the process by which an individual makes a moral evaluation of someone's behavior according to the moral code when faced with a situation involving moral issues. Moral judgment itself has a strong social attribute. Most of the previous studies on moral dilemmas are based on the perspective of single individuals, and there is a lack of exploration of the psychological mechanism of moral decision-making in public situations or social situations where multiple people exist. In addition, the traditional moral dilemma paradigm based on the dual processing theory of moral judgment has been questioned by many researchers, who believe that it lacks ecological validity and is too absolute for the division between utilitarianism and deontology. The CNI model provides a comprehensive distinction of the cognitive processing involved in moral judgment and clarifies whether changes in moral decision-making are caused by sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to norms, or general action/inaction tendencies.
This study conducted two experiments to investigate the cognitive mechanisms of moral judgment in different social contexts, and the moral dilemma materials in each experiment were constructed based on the CNI model. Experiment 1 used the social observation paradigm, in which participants were asked to perform a moral judgment task under the supervision of two independent and unfamiliar observers, to investigate whether an individual's moral judgment would be affected by a simple decision exposure. The results showed that participants’ moral judgement was not affected by the presence or absence of the observer in the context of other people's observations.
In experiment 2, we conducted parallel judgment paradigms and joint judgment paradigm to investigate how the participants' moral decisions changed. To better explain the difference between the different social contexts, perceived stress and social approval were also measured during the moral judgment task. Participants did not know each other in each paradigm. In the parallel judgment paradigm, participants were asked to judge the same moral dilemma without verbal communication, and then the judgment results of both parties were published after they had completed their judgements. The purpose was to examine whether individuals' moral judgments would be influenced by social feedback when they received information about others' judgments. The results showed that in the parallel judgment context, participants' low decision acceptance was due to their inaction tendency. In the joint judgment paradigm, two participants were required to make a joint decision about the same dilemma without verbal communication, and both pairs were required to reach consensus decisions on each dilemma. The results showed that in the joint judgment situation, the low decision acceptance of the participants was partly due to increased sensitivity to moral norms and a more pronounced tendency to inaction, and they had lower levels of perceived stress and higher levels of social approval. This suggests that when the final decision result was shared by two people, the responsibility of the individual alone became smaller, and the corresponding pressure perception was reduced. Meanwhile, participants in the joint judgment group wanted to be approved and approved by the other person, and in order to achieve this, their moral decisions became more in line with the requirements of social norms to improve their image.
Taken together, the results of the two experiments suggest that individuals are more inclined to make unacceptable moral decisions in the presence of others, and that this seemingly more moral decision stems on the one hand from the increased sensitivity of moral norms caused by the desire for higher social approval, and on the other hand from the general inaction tendency caused by the dispersion of responsibilities. Our finding indicate that different social situations have different effects on moral judgment.
关键词
公开情境 /
道德两难 /
CNI模型
Key words
public situation /
moral dilemma /
CNI model
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基金
*本研究得到河北省社会科学基金项目（HB20JY013）的资助
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