PDF(264 KB)
The Formation Mechanism of Ambiguity Aversion: A Perspective Based on the Evaluability Hypothesis
Journal of Psychological Science ›› 2012, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (1) : 177-179.
PDF(264 KB)
PDF(264 KB)
The Formation Mechanism of Ambiguity Aversion: A Perspective Based on the Evaluability Hypothesis
Ambiguity aversion refers to that people prefers events with known probabilities to similar ambiguous events where the decision maker does not know the values of the probabilities. Since ambiguity aversion was proposed by Ellsberg in 1961 years, lots of research has been done to it. Now there are three main models accounting for ambiguity aversion: other evaluation hypothesis, competence hypothesis and comparative ignorance hypothesis. Other evaluation hypothesis suggested that increasing the number of people watching a decision enhanced ambiguity aversion, and enhanced it more than other factors that they manipulated. Competence hypothesis suggested that people prefer betting on their own judgment over an equiprobable chance event when they consider themselves knowledgeable, but not otherwise. Comparative ignorance hypothesis suggested that ambiguity aversion increases with the perception that others are more competent and more knowledgeable. If people choose an ambiguous option and receive a bad outcome, then they fear criticisms by others. Such criticisms are easier to counter after a risky choice, when a bad outcome is more easily explained as bad luck, than after an ambiguous choice. To investigate the influence of joint evaluation and separate evaluation on individuals’ ambiguity aversion, a 2 (ambiguous event vs. risky event) * 2 ( joint evaluation vs. separate evaluation) mixed experimental design was adopted. Study investigate formation mechanism of ambiguity aversion from domains of chance events and natural events, paradigm of joint evaluation and separate evaluation was adopted. The results showed that, ambiguity aversion is produced by a comparison with less ambiguous events.
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