Abstract: On the traditional view, conceptual representations are abstract symbols which don’t have any connections with perception systems. The embodied theories of conceptual representation hold that conceptual representation is grounded in the same neural systems that govern sensation, perception and action. Therefore the perceptual systems are central to concepts representations. However, perceptual representations are ill-suited for representing abstract concepts. This limitation implies that our conceptual system may employ multiple representation processing, one involve perceptual system which are suited for bearing perceptually derived contents and the another involve abstract symbols which are suited for bearing abstract contents. The evidence from pathology literature, cognitive neuroscience studies and behavior studies found different patterns of representation are associated with the processing of concrete and abstract concepts which support this representational pluralism. The interrelation between different representation mechanisms should be investigated in the future researches.

Key words: conceptual representation, embodied cognition, abstract symbols, representational pluralism

摘要： 传统的认知主义认为概念表征是与主体的感知系统无关的抽象符号。而具身理论则认为，概念表征以主体的感觉、知觉运动系统为基础的，感知系统在概念表征中具有中心作用。然而，具身性假设无法恰当的解释抽象概念表征这一问题。这种局限性说明主体的概念系统可能具有多元表征机制：既包括感知表征以加工与身体经验相关的具体知识，也包括抽象符号表征以加工与身体经验无关的抽象知识。来自病理学、认知神经科学和行为实验的实证研究证明了不同类型的概念会涉及不同的表征机制，证实了多元表征存在的合理性。今后的研究应探讨各种表征机制之间的关系等问题。

关键词: 概念表征, 具身认知, 抽象符号, 多元表征